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much across transition economies. We identify dependence on natural resources and the 
historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution 
building during transition. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to 
extract the exogenous component of institution building, we also show the importance of 
institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition 
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1. Introduction 
The transition process has opened a wide wedge in economic development among the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While in 1992, GDP per 
capita in constant 2000 US dollars varied between 300 and 7,000 for the countries in this region, 
it varied between 200 and 11,000 in the year 2004. During the same period, GDP per capita 
increased by 64 percent in Poland and shrank by 26 percent in neighboring Ukraine. While all 
transition economies faced the difficult task of building new market-compatible institutions, the 
process and success of reform has varied greatly across countries. Generally, the Central and 
Eastern European countries proved to be more successful reformers and today score better in 
terms of institutional and economic development than the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
including the Baltic States. Why have some transition economies fared so much better than 
others? Why have some transition economies succeeded in building a new institutional 
framework after the fall of socialism, while others have not?   
This paper proposes and tests a hypothesis based on political economy of why institution 
building has varied so much across countries in this part of the world and shows the importance 
of institution building in explaining the variation in economic performance across transition 
economies. The literature examining the growth experience of transition economies over the last 
decade has focused mostly on reform strategies – shock versus gradualism –, macroeconomic 
policies and initial conditions to explain the dramatic variation in growth across transition 
economies (for an overview, see Svejnar 2002). However, as noted by Campos and Coricelli 
(2002) in their review of the literature on growth in transition economies, the role of institutions 
has largely been neglected in empirical analysis of economic growth in transition economies. 
This is in contrast to an extensive cross-country growth literature that has discussed the 
importance of institutions.   
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The experience of transition economies offers a unique historic experiment in institution 
building. The transition started with the rapid destruction of the institutions supporting socialism 
in all transition economies. The building of new institutions supporting a broad-based market 
economy, however, has been much slower and has varied significantly across transition 
economies.
1
This paper offers a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied 
so much across transition countries, building on North’s hypothesis that “institutions are not 
usually created to be socially efficient, [but] are created to serve the interests of those with 
bargaining power to create new rules” (North, 1990, p. 16). The socialist elite remained a 
powerful political interest group during the initial phase of the transition process in most 
transition countries, but its authority varied across countries depending on their entrenchment in 
power. We conjecture that the incumbent socialist elite or nomenclatura had fewer incentives to 
create institutions that fostered competition, as this would reduce their economic power. Further, 
economies that rely more on natural resources offer larger opportunities for the elite to extract 
rents; the elites have therefore less incentive to establish strong property rights.  Political 
entrenchment and reliance on natural resources critically determined whether the behavior of the 
ruling elite and thus the transition process was “catalytic” or “extractive”. We use the number of 
years a country has been socialist as proxy for the entrenchment of the socialist elite and thus 
their power to influence the transition process, and the share of natural resource exports in GDP 
at the beginning of the transition process as an indicator of the dominance of natural resources in 
the economy and as a proxy for the elite’s opportunities to extract rents.  We show that countries 
that had been longer under socialist government and rely more on natural resources experienced 
less institution building over the first decade of transition. This finding is robust to using 
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different indicators of institution building and controlling for other factors that might be 
associated with institution building.   
We also assess the relationship between institutional and economic development.  To 
control for simultaneity bias and reverse causation, we use the component of institutional 
development that can be explained by natural resource reliance and socialist entrenchment, and 
relate it to GDP per capita growth rates over the period 1992 through 2004. We test the 
robustness of our results by using an alternative proxy for economic development, growth in 
household consumption. Our results indicate a strong and robust relationship between the 
exogenous component of institutional development and economic growth.  This relationship is 
robust to using different indicators of institution building and to controlling for other factors 
associated with cross-country variation in GDP per capita growth, including initial conditions, 
macroeconomic policies and reform strategies.  
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the vast literature on 
the economics of transition, and on the growth experiences of transition economies in particular.
2
This literature has focused mostly on the relative importance of reform strategies (including 
liberalization policies), macroeconomic policies, and initial conditions in explaining output 
performance. Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996) find a positive relationship between progress in 
liberalizing prices, trade, capital account and ownership and output growth. Macroeconomic 
policies, in particular the effectiveness of the government in controlling inflation, have also been 
shown to be associated with economic performance during the transition (Fischer, Sahay, and 
Vegh 1996). Initial conditions, such as the distance to Western Europe, have also been found to 
be important factors in explaining variation in growth paths of transition economies (De Melo et 
al. 2001, and Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey 2002).
3
 4 
Our work is also linked to the literature on institutional development and economic 
growth. Jones (1981) and North (1981) discuss the importance of good institutions for economic 
development.
4
 Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) show 
that institutions are more robustly associated with faster economic growth than policies. Our 
paper is closely related to a series of papers by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson and their 
methodology as described in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004).  First, we also focus on 
the importance of institutions for economic development, but we do this for a group of countries 
– the transition economies – for which an exogenous shock, namely the collapse of socialism, 
provides a natural and meaningful testing ground of the impact of institution building on growth. 
Second, we also consider that economic institutions are endogenous, and that institutional change 
depends on the economic interests of those groups with political power. Third, we take from 
their work the notion that the degree of power of the ruling groups depends on their internal 
consistency and the resources on which their power is based.  
While these two literatures have largely developed on their own, in recent years the 
transition literature has begun to consider the importance of institutions for economic 
development. One of the first authors on the topic was Murrell (1995), who argued that 
differences in post-transition performance across countries might be best explained by the 
effectiveness of newly created institutions. Since then, several others have argued that 
institutions may exert a profound influence on economic development in transition countries 
(e.g., Dewatripont and Roland 1997, McMillan 1997, and Hoff and Stiglitz 2004). However, 
empirical evidence remains sparse, mainly because thus far the time interval available for 
empirical analysis has been too short to conduct a robust analysis. Exceptions are Grogan and 
Moers (2001) and Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden (2003) who both use broad measures of 
institutional development to study the link between institutions and growth.
5
 Their results 
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provide evidence for a positive relationship between institutions and growth. However, neither 
study offers a conceptual framework for the importance of institutions in explaining variations in 
growth or fully explores the endogeneity between economic performance and institutional 
development.
6
 Thus, while both studies provide valuable initial attempts to assess the empirical 
relationship between institutions and economic growth, these analyses do not offer robust and 
conclusive evidence of this relationship.  
Now that we have more than a decade of growth experience, empirical analysis of the 
relationship between institution building, its determinants and growth in transition economies has 
become feasible and desirable. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that (i) presents a 
conceptual framework of institutional development in transition countries based on 
predetermined factors and tests this framework using data on endowments and outcome 
measures of institutional development, and (ii) investigates the relationship between the 
exogenous component of institutional development and economic growth for a large number of 
transition economies. 
 We would like to point to several limitations of our analysis. First, we assess the 
determinants and consequences of institution building broadly defined.  While we also consider 
indices that capture specific dimensions such as rule of law or control of corruption, we do not 
explore specific institutional arrangements. Second, while our analysis controls for reverse 
causation and simultaneity bias, the specification tests on the appropriateness of instruments are 
weak, so that we are cautious in our interpretation. Third, we focus on institutions while 
controlling for the impact of policies. We do not disentangle institutions and policies because the 
difference between the two is hard to define. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a framework of 
institution building across transition economies and provides empirical evidence. Section 3 
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presents evidence on the relationship between institutional and economic development and 
section 4 concludes.
2.  Institution Building in Transition Economies 
This section develops a conceptual framework to explain the wide variation in institution 
building that can be observed across transition economies.  We then show that reliance on natural 
resources and entrenchment of the socialist elite can explain institution building. 
2. 1. Institution Building in Transition Economies: A Conceptual Framework 
Institutions – both formal and informal – are the underlying rules that govern transactions 
between agents in an economy, both transactions between private parties, as well as between 
private parties and the government. Property rights and contract enforcement are two crucial 
elements of the institutional framework. By allowing for the creation, registration and 
enforcement of private property rights vis-à-vis other private parties and the government, the 
institutional framework gives incentives for investment in tangible and intangible assets and risk-
taking (Claessens and Laeven 2003, Johnson, MacMillan and Woodruff 2002). By allowing for 
the efficient enforcement of contracts, the institutional framework encourages market-based 
commercial and financial transactions.  While the socialist economies had a well-defined 
institutional framework, these institutions did not allow for effective private property and for 
market-based exchange.  As the transition countries embarked on the transformation of their 
economies to market economies, they thus faced the task of building new institutions.   
Our explanation of institutional development is based on the behavior and the incentives 
of the elite during the transition period. In some countries, the elite actively fostered a transition 
to a market economy with a broad base of participants in the economic and political life through 
the provision of basic property rights and rule of law. In other countries, the elite was mostly 
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concerned with securing for themselves property rights in the formerly state-owned enterprises to 
extract economic rents and thus securing economic and political power in the post-transition 
society. We refer to these two opposite transition experiences as “catalytic transition” and 
“extractive transition”.
7
We conjecture that the behavior of the elite during transition was largely determined by 
two main country characteristics: the endowment with natural resources and the entrenchment of 
the ruling elite during the socialist period. The “natural resource” argument is well defined in the 
literature and often referred to as the curse of natural resources (Sachs and Warner 2001).  Given 
the surplus character of natural resources, we expect the elite at the beginning of the transition 
period to be most interested in securing the property rights over these resources that gave them a 
power base. It is generally easier to materialize short-term profits from natural resources such as 
oil than from fixed assets such as manufacturing plants, equipment and machinery, because 
proceeds from natural resources depend less on the creation of a market, on human capital, and 
on R&D investments. Moreover, at the beginning of the transition, most manufacturing plants in 
transition countries had assets that were outdated and produced goods that were well below 
Western standards, and an upgrade of these facilities required substantial investments that few 
were willing to bite into given the absence of secure property rights and the cost of financial 
capital.
8
 Elites in extractive transition countries were therefore less interested in establishing 
general property rights for the public at large and, in general, in establishing an institutional 
framework for a market economy with broad-based participation.
The second channel of institution building we consider relates to the entrenchment of the 
ruling elite during the socialist period. We conjecture that the degree of political entrenchment is 
largely determined by the country’s time under socialism. One of the consequences of an 
extended time under socialism and the consequent centralization of power was the absence of 
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any political opposition, or even civil society institutions and social networks, such as churches, 
political clubs, and trade unions to challenge the power of the political incumbents (as in Becker 
1983). These entrenched political elites are less inclined to share economic and political power 
during the transition process because they can use their political power to extract rents. In 
addition, outside opportunities for these bureaucrats are generally limited. In countries where 
communists were in power for a shorter period of time civil society groups may have been better 
able to retain ground. As a result, in these countries a new political elite is more likely to emerge 
during the transition period and take over from the ruling elite under socialism. Our theory 
predicts that political elites in the original countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) with a 
long period of communist rule continued to exercise substantial power during the transition 
period and as a result these countries were less willing to engage in market reforms and establish 
general property rights. In Central Europe, the Baltic States and Moldova, with less time under 
socialism, the old elites had fewer possibilities to clinch to power. 
Belarus and the Ukraine, the two countries in our sample together with Russia that have 
been longest under communism, illustrate our point.
9
 Upon gaining independence, the 
communists remained in power in both countries. The Soviet economic and social structure had 
provided a social safety net, and the need for economic reforms was not apparent (World Bank 
2002). Because of its strong historical link to Russia, Belarus remained a close ally of Russia and 
institutional development has been one of the lowest among all transition economies. Ukraine 
also made little progress in structural reform during the initial transition years and the business 
environment is still plagued by government interventions, weak property rights, onerous taxes, 
and corruption. Not surprisingly, Ukraine’s economic growth performance over the period 1992-
2004 has been the worst of all transition economies except for Moldova and Tajikistan. 
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We posit that resource endowments and entrenchment of the socialist elite together 
influenced institution building during the beginning of transition. Elites that were less entrenched 
had fewer possibilities and elites in economies less dependent on natural resources had fewer 
incentives to clinch to power and were thus more likely to allow the emergence of public 
property rights and rule of law (see Hoff and Stiglitz 2004 for a formalized model).
10
 Our 
premise that the effects of natural resource endowments and entrenchment on institutional 
development are complimentary is confirmed by the data. While there is little variation in the 
degree of political entrenchment across former FSU countries, there is a large variation in natural 
resource endowments within FSU countries. Hence, even among FSU countries there is a wide 
range of variation in the behavior of the elite and the degree of institution building during the 
transition period. While both the presence of significant resource endowments and an entrenched 
elite turned out to be detrimental to the emergence of secure property rights and rule of law, the 
effect was reinforced by the presence of both. 
A case in point is Armenia, a landlocked country with few natural resources that gained 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 while having a conflict with neighboring 
Azerbaijan over the territory Nagorno Karabakh. Despite a long socialist tradition as a member 
of the FSU, the war with Azerbaijan led to a strong nationalist movement under the leadership of 
Levon Petrosian, who gained power in the first parliamentary elections. Under his government, 
Armenia initiated important reforms, such as land and housing reforms, a first step to the 
establishment of property rights. Reforms were accompanied by improvements in the rule of law 
and control of corruption. Compared to its neighboring countries, Armenia’s has shown strong 
institution building and economic performance. In fact, Armenia’s GDP per capita growth over 
the period 1992 to 2004 has been one of the highest among all transition economies in our 
sample. While the war with Azerbaijan may have played an important role in shifting the balance 
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of political power from the communists to the nationalists, it seems unlikely that this alone can 
explain subsequent reform and economic performance. Azerbaijan was involved in the same war, 
but the communists retained power and economic growth during the transition period was 
substantially lower than the average across transition economies.
11
 A key difference between the 
two countries is the endowments of natural resources, Armenia having relatively few natural 
resources and Azerbaijan having substantial oil reserves and rich mineral deposits. Our 
hypothesis is that the level of natural resources is a key factor in explaining why the nationalists 
of Armenia did initiate market-based reforms, while the communists of Azerbaijan have shown 
little interest in moving to a market economy. 
Another example is Albania, by far the poorest country of Central and Eastern Europe 
before the onset of the transition period, and a country with little natural resources. When the 
communist regime fell in 1990, Albania was a failed state on the verge of a complete breakdown 
in civil order. The first “free” elections were held in 1991 and won by the ex-Communist Party, 
but economic decline led to strikes and a call for new elections in 1992 that were won by the 
Democratic Party, ending 47 years of communist rule. Because of a lack of natural resources, the 
benefits and rents associated with political power were much smaller in Albania than in countries 
with an abundance of natural resources. This meant a strong support for a democratic 
government and institutional reform. Despite its dismal initial conditions, Albania became one of 
the star performers in terms of macroeconomic performance, with a GDP per capita growth over 
the period 1992 to 2004 of more than 6 percent per year, the highest in our sample. 
2.2. Measuring Institutional Development 
We focus on a broad indicator of institutional development, as computed by Kaufman, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004, henceforth KKM). Drawing on 25 different data sources constructed 
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by 18 different institutions, KKM estimate six different dimensions of institutional development: 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of 
corruption and political stability.
12
 Each of the six measures is a principal component indicator 
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, estimated with an unobserved component 
model to control for missing observations across the different variables. While KKM present 
estimates of these six indicators for 1996 to 2004, we will focus on the indicators for 1996, the 
earliest available time period.
13
Our main variable Institutional Development is the average of these six variables and 
varies between –1.68 in Tajikistan and 0.78 in the Czech Republic. Table 1 presents Institutional 
Development across the 24 countries of our sample.
14
 Definitions and data sources of the 
variables used in this paper can be found in the Appendix. The overall mean of Institutional 
Development, –0.20, is below the mean for a world-wide sample (which is zero), while the 
standard deviation 0.62 is below the standard deviation for the world-wide sample (0.95), 
suggesting that there is less variation in institutional development across transition economies 
than across a broader sample of developed, developing and transition economies. The standard 
deviation of Institutional Development between 1996 and 2004 increases from 0.62 to 0.89, 
suggesting that the institutional gap has widened further across the transition economies.     
Our analysis might seem restricted by using institutional development in 1996 rather than 
at the beginning of the sample period for the growth regressions.  However, we see the use of 
institutional development in 1996 rather than in 1992 not necessarily as a shortcoming.  As 
discussed above, the transition economies experienced a period of rapid institutional change – 
first institutional destruction and then a varying process of institutional creation. Our measure of 
institutions in 1996 thus captures institution building over the first years of transition.  Further, in 
robustness tests, we compute a measure of institutional change by considering the difference 
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between ICRG measures of Rule of Law and Corruption at the beginning of the transition period 
and the corresponding component of Institutional Development in 1996.  The shortcoming of this 
measure is that we have to take the initial value for the Soviet Union for all FSU countries and 
the initial value for Yugoslavia for all the Former Yugoslav republics in our sample.
 15
Critics have pointed to the fact that proxies of institutional development are outcome-
oriented rather than measuring inputs (Glaeser et al. 2004). In robustness tests, we therefore also 
use the EBRD reform index as a measure of legislative and regulatory inputs into institutional 
development. The EBRD index measures reforms in the areas of enterprise reform, competition 
policy, banking sector reform, and reform of non-banking financial institutions.
16
 Further, 
recognizing the bi-directional causality from institutional to economic development, we extract 
the exogenous component of institutional development and relate it to economic development. A 
positive relationship between institutional and economic development, however, does not 
suggest that there is no reverse causation from economic to institutional development; rather it 
suggests that our findings are not due to this reverse causation. 
2.3. Proxies for Endowments and Socialist Entrenchment 
 We use the share of fuel, ores, and metal exports relative to GDP, as measured in the first 
available year of the sample period, as proxy for the importance of natural resources in an 
economy.  Table 1 shows quite a variation across transition economies, ranging from less than a 
percent in Latvia and Albania to 55% in Tajikistan. A simple bivariate regression shows that raw 
exports explain 48% of cross-country variation in Institutional Development. In robustness tests, 
we use gas reserves per capita in 1990 as indicator of endowments with natural resources.   
While Initial Raw Exports and gas reserves per capita are positively and significantly correlated 
with each, the correlation is far from perfect (Table 2).  While Initial Raw Exports is a more 
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comprehensive measure of natural resources, gas reserves per capita could be considered more 
exogenous as it refers to exploitable resources rather than actual exploitation. We do not find a 
significant correlation between natural resource reliance and the rate of depreciation or measures 
of enrollment, two other channels through which natural resource endowments are conjectured to 
impact economic development (Sachs and Warner 2001).  
To capture the historic experience of transition economies during the socialist period and 
thus the entrenchment of the socialist elite at the start of the transition period, we use Years 
under Socialism, the number of years a country has spent under Socialism. This variable varies 
from 40 years for Hungary, one of the last countries to become socialist after World War II and 
one of the first countries to start the transition process in 1989, to 74 years for Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine, the core countries of the Former Soviet Union. Variation in Years under Socialism 
explains 58% of variation in Institutional Development. As alternative indicator of entrenchment 
we use Executive Constraints 1930, which measures on a scale from one to seven the de facto 
political independence of a country’s chief executive. We use this indicator to measure the 
historical memory of interest groups, political debate and competition, which should impact the 
degree to which the socialist elites were able to maintain a grip on power during the transition 
process.  Unlike Years under Socialism, this variable provides quite some variation for non-FSU 
transition economies, ranging from one in Albania to seven in the case of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics.  Years under Socialism and Executive Constraints in 1930 are positively and 
significantly (10% level) correlated with each other.  
While the Reliance on Natural Resources and Years under Socialism variables are 
significantly and positively correlated with each other (correlation coefficient of 42%, significant 
at the 5% level), this is by far a perfect correlation. On the one hand, we have countries like 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia that have few natural resources and have spent little time 
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under socialism. Not surprisingly, these three countries have quickly developed market-based 
institutions, judging by our indicator. On the other hand, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan have both high levels of natural resources and highly entrenched socialist elites. 
These three countries have among the lowest value for our indicator of institutional development.  
However, we have also countries that score differently on our two conjectured determinants of 
institution building. Belarus and Ukraine have few natural resources, but very entrenched 
socialist elites, while Bulgaria and Macedonia have substantial natural resources, and a socialist 
elite that was not as entrenched. Belarus, Ukraine and Macedonia have values of institutional 
development below the sample average and median, and Bulgaria ranks eleventh in our measure 
of institutional development, slightly above the sample average.  
2.4. Natural Resources, Socialist Entrenchment and Institutional Development 
The results in Table 3 provide statistical evidence that natural resource reliance and time 
spent under socialism critically influenced institution building over the first years of transition.  
Both Years under Socialism and Initial Raw Exports enter negatively and significantly at the 1% 
level in the regression of Institutional Development indicating that countries with a longer 
socialist heritage and more reliant on natural resources had higher levels of institutional 
development in 1996. Together, these two variables explain 76% of variation in institutional 
development across transition economies (column 1).
Using alternative indicators of institution building confirms our finding. In columns 2 and 
3, we use the change in institutional development as dependent variables. Specifically, we 
compute the difference between the Rule of Law and Control of Corruption indicators 
constructed by KKM for 1996 and the respective ICRG indicators for the first year of transition.  
Using these indicators of institutional change confirms our findings. Years under Socialism 
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enters negatively and significantly at the 1% level in both regressions.  Initial Raw Exports enters 
negatively and significantly at the 5% in column 2 and at the 10% level in column 3.  Finally, in 
column 4, we use the institutional reform indicator, constructed by EBRD for 1996. Using the 
institutional reform rather than the institutional development indicator confirms our results.  
Using alternative proxies for socialist entrenchment and natural resource reliance 
confirms our findings. Gas reserves per capita, our alternative indicator of endowments enters at 
the 1% level, while Years under Socialism continues to enter at the 1% level (column 5). 
Similarly, using Executive Constraints in 1930 as alternative indicator of entrenchment and 
historical memory does not change our results (column 6). Finally, column 7 shows initial raw 
exports in GDP can explain cross-country variation in institutional development across the 14 
FSU countries in our sample, all of which have been under socialism for more than 50 years. Our 
results are thus not only driven by the difference in Years under Socialism, but also by different 
endowments with raw materials. 
The empirical relationship between socialist entrenchment, natural resources and 
institution building is robust to controlling for other country traits that might be associated with 
faster institutional development. Table 4 presents regressions where we include control variables, 
one at a time, in the baseline regression of Institutional Development on Years under Socialism 
and Initial Raw Exports. There is no evidence that FSU countries, i.e. countries dominated by 
Russia for at least 50 years, or countries with closer economic links to other transition 
economies, as measured by the Trade Share with CMEA partners relative to GDP in 1990, 
experienced slower institution building once we control for the time spent under socialism 
(columns 1 and 2).
17
 Controlling for strong links to the political and economic past, however, 
does not alter the results.  Being closer to Western Europe did not speed up institution building, 




 Distance from Vienna does not enter significantly, while a dummy variable for countries 
that entered the EU in 2003 enters positively and significantly at the 1% level. The positive 
coefficient can be explained with the prospect of future EU membership fostering institution 
building, both through political incentives and through assistance from the original EU member 
states (Roland and Verdier 2003). Controlling for EU Accession, however, does not affect our 
finding of a negative relationship between socialist entrenchment, natural resources and 
institution building. Ethnic fractionalization or being landlocked does not seem to have an impact 
on institution building (columns 5 and 6). Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic 
fractionalization fosters rent-seeking and might not be conducive to the building of strong market 
institutions. Bloom and Sachs (1998) show that landlocked economies experience lower growth 
rates.  Our results do not provide evidence for either hypothesis. Countries that have a longer 
tradition of state-level institutions did not experience faster institution building in the early years 
of the transition process (column 7). Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) compute an index 
of state antiquity, a measure of experience with state-level government, and show that countries 
with a longer tradition of state-level government have higher levels of political stability, 
institutional development and income per capita. For our sample of transition economies, 
however, this relationship does not hold and the negative association of socialist entrenchment 
and natural resource reliance with institutional development is not affected. Countries that 
suffered a civil war during the sample period, on the other hand, experience slower institution 
building (column 8). In column 9 we control for the level of education using data on enrollment 
into tertiary schools from the World Development Indicators. Again, the results are not altered 
and higher university enrolment is not associated with faster institution building.
19
  Repressed 
inflation during the pre-transition era also does not alter the results (column 10). We control for 
price distortions by using the increase in deflated wages minus the change in real GDP over the 
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period 1987 to 1990 (De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 1996). However, initial price distortions are 
not significantly associated with institution building and controlling for them does not affect our 
results.  Controlling for the initial state of price and trade liberalization and importance of the 
private sector as well as the speed with which reforms in these areas were implemented does not 
affect our findings (column 11). To assess the sensitivity of our results to controlling for 
macroeconomic reforms we use indicators developed by de Melo et al. (2001) for price, trade 
and ownership liberalization, with annual values for the period 1990-97.  We use the values for 
1990 to proxy for the initial condition of price, trade and ownership liberalization in transition 
economies and calculate a principal component indicator of these three indices. Similarly, we use 
a principal component indicator of changes in price, trade and ownership liberalization over the 
period 1990-97, thus controlling for the speed of liberalization. Both variables enter significantly 
and positively, suggesting that transition economies that started the transition process earlier and 
implemented reforms faster also experienced faster institution building.  Finally, the privatization 
technique does not seem to matter (column 12). Countries broadly opted for one of two 
privatization methods: direct sales and equity offerings, or mass privatization (also known as 
voucher privatization) (Bolton and Roland 1992).
20
 Rather than being sold to strong outside 
investors, most shares from the voucher privatization have ended up in the hands of the managers 
and their friends, who had little incentive to engage in corporate restructuring (Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1994).
21
 However, we cannot find an independent effect of the privatization 
technique on institutional development.   
 Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 support our hypothesis of institution building in 
transition economies.  Countries whose economies are more based on natural resources and 
whose socialist governments were more entrenched have experienced slower institution building. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that the elites in these countries were less willing to give 
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up economic and political power and therefore were more interested in preventing the build-up 
of market-compatible institutions that would threaten their hold on the economy. 
3. Institutions and Growth in Transition Economies 
This section tests the importance of institution building for economic growth across 
transition economies. Using our findings from the previous section, we relate the exogenous 
component of institution building, explained by natural resource endowment and socialist 
entrenchment, to measures of economic development. 
3.1. Measures of Economic Development and Methodology 
In line with the empirical growth literature, our main indicator of economic development 
is GDP per capita growth, averaged over the period 1992 to 2004. Growth in GDP per capita 
over the sample period varied between –5.2% in Tajikistan to 5.6% in Albania, with an average 
of 0.8% and a standard deviation of 2.7% (Table 1).  As alternative indicator of economic 
development, we use the growth rate in final household consumption expenditure per capita in 
constant local currency, averaged over the period 1992 to 2004.  Household consumption might 
be a more direct measure of economic welfare than GDP, since it focuses on market-based 
consumption by the population. For our sample, household consumption per capita shows much 
greater variation over time than GDP per capita growth.  
 Throughout the regression analysis, we will use Two-Stage Least Square Regressions to 
empirically relate the exogenous component of Institutional Development to economic 
development. Specifically, we will regress Institutional Development on Years under Socialism, 
Initial Raw Exports and other exogenous variables in the first stage, and regress our respective 
indicator of economic development on the predicted value of Institutional Development and the 
other exogenous variables in the second stage. To test for the appropriateness of the econometric 
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model, we report the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are not correlated with the error terms, the test has a χ2 distribution with (J-K) 
degrees of freedom, where J is the number of instruments and K the number of regressors. We 
also report the F-test that natural resource reliance and time under socialism do not explain 
Institutional Development in the first stage. While our focus is on the IV results, we also present 
the coefficient on Institutional Development from the corresponding OLS regression.   
Given our relatively small sample of 24 countries, additional to Institutional 
Development, we include in our baseline regression only the log of initial GDP per capita in US 
dollars to control for convergence in GDP per capita across countries.  When using growth in 
household consumption per capita as indicator of economic development, we include the log of 
initial household consumption per capita.   In robustness tests, we will control for other variables 
that the literature has related to economic performance in cross-country growth regressions or 
specifically in the transition experience.  We have already used some of these variables as 
control variables in Table 4 and will discuss the other variables as we present the different 
robustness tests. Table 5 presents the correlation between GDP per capita, Institutional 
Development and the different control variables.  We note that not only Institutional 
Development, but also, ethnic fractionalization and a dummy for the EU Accession countries are 
significantly (5% level) correlated with GDP per capita growth, while most reform indicators and 
policy variables are not significantly correlated with growth.  Institutional Development is 
significantly correlated with the FSU dummy, the EU Accession dummy, the civil war dummy, 
distance from Vienna, initial liberalization and monetary growth.  This underlines the importance 
of controlling for these variables when assessing the robustness of the relationship between 
institution building and GDP per capita growth.    
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3.2. Institutions and Growth: Results 
The results in Table 6 suggest a strong relationship between the exogenous component of 
institutional development and GDP per capita growth over the transition period until 2004. In 
both OLS and IV regression, Institutional Development enters significantly at the 5% level 
(column 1).  The specification tests confirm the appropriateness of the instrumental variables.  
First, the F-test that Raw Exports and Years under Socialism are jointly insignificant in the first 
stage is rejected at the 1% level.  Second, the test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected in 
any of the regressions, suggesting that our instrumental variables do not impact GDP per capita 
growth beyond their impact through Institutional Development.   
The relationship between the exogenous component of Institutional Development and 
GDP per capita growth is not only statistically but also economically significant. The coefficient 
size in column 1 indicates that a one standard deviation in Institutional Development (0.62) can 
explain a growth difference of 1.6 percentage points per year – almost 60% of a standard 
deviation in GDP per capita growth, which adds up to a difference in GDP per capita after twelve 
years of 21 percent. 
We are concerned that the results may be driven by outliers. As above, we follow Besley, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980) to identify influential outliers. We identify Albania, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as influential outliers and re-run regression 1 without these four 
countries.  Column 2 of Table 6 shows that Institutional Development still enters significantly at 
the 5% level and with an even higher coefficient. 
The remaining columns in Table 6 show the robustness of our results to alternative 
indicators of institution building and economic development. Columns 3 and 4 show that our 
results are robust to using alternative indicators of institutional change, introduced in the 
previous section. Both Change in Rule of Law and Change in Control of Corruption, measured 
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over the period 1990-96 enter positively and significantly at the 5% level. The EBRD indicator 
of institutional reforms, on the other hand, enters positively and significantly only at the 12% 
level (column 5). Our findings are also confirmed when using an alternative indicator of 
economic development.  Institutional Development enters positively at the 1% level in the 
regression of household consumption per capita growth (column 6). Interestingly, the initial 
dependent variable, though always negative, only enters significantly in the regression of growth 
of household consumption per capita. We also note that the IV coefficients are in most cases 
larger than the OLS coefficients, consistent with Kraay and Kaufman (2002).   
Table 7 shows the robustness of the growth-institution relationship to controlling for 
other growth determinants considered in the transition economics literature.  In all cases, 
Institutional Development enters positively and significantly at least at the 10% level, unless 
otherwise noted. The first-stage F-test and the test of overidentifying restrictions confirm our 
model. In none of the regressions does the coefficient of Institutional Development fall 
significantly, indicating that the measured exogenous component of Institutional Development 
does not proxy for any of these other factors. 
We find that our measures of initial conditions do not explain growth variation across 
transition economies. The results in columns 1 and 2 show no significant effect of being an FSU 
country or having stronger trade links with CMEA on GDP per capita growth, while the positive 
and significant impact of the exogenous component of Institutional Development is confirmed.
22
We do not find that more ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant impact on 
economic growth. However, the positive effect of institutional development on economic growth 
remains significant (column 3). Similarly, countries that are landlocked do not grow faster, while 
controlling for this geographic country trait does not affect our main finding (column 4).
23
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While a dummy variable for the countries that entered the EU in 2003 does not enter 
significantly, Institutional Development enters with a p-value of only 10.1% level (column 5). 
This reduced significance can be explained by the high correlation between both variables, which 
results in multicollinearity.
24
  Closer geographic proximity to Western Europe, as measured by 
distance to Vienna, does not translate into higher growth and controlling for distance does not 
change our results (column 6).  
Surprisingly, the civil war dummy enters positively and significantly (column 7). Perhaps 
civil war redistributed power of political incumbents and offered a window of opportunity for 
institutional and economic reform. Also, growth has generally been found to accelerate after 
extended periods of civil war (Collier 1999). Our main finding of a positive and significant 
relationship between institutional and economic development, however, is not affected. 
Column 8 shows that the relationship between Institutional Development and economic 
growth is robust to controlling for a measure of human capital accumulation.  Glaeser et al. 
(2004) argue that human capital accumulation rather than institutions cause growth. Tertiary 
enrollment enters negatively, but insignificantly in the regression, while Institutional 
Development continues to enter positively and significantly.
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  The insignificant coefficient on 
Tertiary enrolment might reflect overinvestment in education pre-transition. 
We find that macroeconomic policies and the speed of reform also do not explain the 
differences in GDP per capita growth across transition economies.  Neither the initial level of 
liberalization in 1990 nor the changes in liberalization over the period 1990-97 enter 
significantly in the regression, while Institutional Development continues to enter positively and 
significantly (column 9).
26
 Our Table 4 results, however, suggested that the speed of reform and 
degree to which these economies liberalized influenced institution building.  In column 10, we 
therefore use the residual of a regression of Institutional Development on initial price, trade and 
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ownership liberalization as well as the speed of reform in these areas.  Together these variables 
explain 80% of the variation in Institutional Development. However, the component of 
Institutional Development not explained by the initial reform level and the speed of reform is 
still significantly and positively associated with economic growth over the first decade of 
transition.
Next, we control for specific policy areas.  In column 11, we control for the privatization 
method.  The negative coefficient on voucher privatization, significant at the 10% level, confirms 
the negative impact of mass voucher privatization on economic performance, while not affecting 
our main result: Institutional Development enters positively and significantly. Further, we 
control for government consumption, as measured by the share of government consumption in 
GDP, averaged over the sample period.  While Government Consumption does not enter 
significantly, Institutional Development enters significantly (column 12).  Finally, we control for 
the growth rate of reserve money as proxy for the monetary policy stance.  While monetary 
growth does not enter significantly, Institutional Development continues to enter positively and 
significantly (column 13).  
3.3. Institutions and Growth: Comparing Pre- and Post-Transition 
 Countries that experienced faster institution building in the early years of transition, 
experienced not only faster GDP per capita growth post-transition, they also experienced 
relatively higher growth rates compared to the pre-transition period.  Up to now, we have 
focused on growth and institution building after the beginning of the transition process. 
Alternatively, one can compare the growth experience before the beginning of transition with the 
growth experience post-transition and relate the difference to institutional change.   How does 
the post-transition growth experience compare to the pre-transition growth experience?  Do 
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changes in growth experience pre- and post-transition vary systematically with the degree to 
which countries built new market-compatible institutions?  
 To assess the relationship between the growth difference pre- and post-transition and 
institution building, we rely on output data for the pre-transition period computed by de Broeck 
and Koen (2000) and Estrin and Urga (1997) and reported by Campos and Coricelli (2002). 
Specifically, we use output growth per capita for the period 1981 to 1990 and compare it to our 
data averaged over 1991 to 2004. Using output data before transition has to be done with even 
more caution than using GDP data from the early years of transition, as these were not market-
based economies.  There is no significant correlation between growth pre- and post-transition. 
Lithuania, Kyrgyz Republic and Belarus were the fastest growing countries before transition, 
while Slovenia and Croatia were the slowest growing economies with negative growth rates.
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So, there was no reversal, convergence or perpetuation of pre-transition growth rates after 
transition started.  Rather, the range and standard deviation of growth rates increased after 
transition started.  While average growth of real GDP per capita over both periods was close to 
zero, GDP per capita growth varied between -5.5% and 3.4% over the post-transition, with a 
standard deviation of 2.4%, while average output per capita growth pre-transition varied between 
-1.6% and 2.9%, with a standard deviation of only 1.4%.
28
 Countries that developed market-compatible institutions at a faster pace experienced an 
acceleration of growth after transition compared to the pre-transition period, while countries that 
lagged in institution building experienced a reversal in their growth pattern compared to the pre-
transition period. Institutional Development is positively and significantly (at the 5% level) 
correlated with the growth difference between these two periods with a correlation of 40%.
29
This confirms our earlier findings. 
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4. Conclusions 
Almost a decade and a half after the start of the transition period in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, we can observe a large variation in institutional and economic development across 
the different countries.  Contrary to their FSU counterparts, the Central and Eastern European 
countries have generally experienced a rapid build-up of market-compatible institutions and 
economic transformation and development, although there are several exceptions in both groups. 
A large literature has attempted to explain the divergent growth experience on the basis of 
differences in economic policies, initial conditions, and reform strategies.   
This paper assesses the importance of institutional development for economic growth 
across 24 transition economies. Building on existing theoretical work, we offer a conceptual 
framework of institutional change and provide empirical evidence in support of this theory. 
Specifically, we conjecture that economies that are based on natural resources and had more 
entrenched socialist elites were less likely to experience the build-up of market-compatible 
institutions. We show that reliance on natural resources and the years under socialism explain 
variation in the speed of building up of market-compatible institutions. Our findings are robust to 
(i) controlling for other country traits that might explain cross-country variation in institution 
building and (ii) the use of different measures of institution building. Then, we relate the 
exogenous component of institutional development explained by natural resource dominance and 
socialist entrenchment to GDP per capita growth over the period 1992 to 2004, and find a strong 
and significant positive relationship. This finding is robust to (i) controlling for a large number of 
macroeconomic, initial and other country characteristics, (ii) using different measures of 
institutional and economic development, and (iii) controlling for outliers.  
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1
 While most transition economies initiated economic reforms to liberalize their economies, only a few countries, 
including Estonia, Hungary and Poland, were able to build institutions to enforce the protection of property rights 
and implement an enabling business environment to encourage investments (World Bank 2002, and Berglof and 
Bolton 2002). On the other extreme, Tajikistan has emerged as one of the least reformed (World Bank 2002) and its 
GDP per capita in 2004 was lower than at the start of the transition period. 
2
 For a comprehensive survey see Campos and Coricelli (2002). 
3
 However, not all results are robust to controlling for additional variables and changes in the time period studied. 
Aslund et al. (1996) find no robust effect of measures of reform and macroeconomic policies on output change 
during the period 1989 to 1995, suggesting other factors may have been important. 
4
 Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), and Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2000) show that this relationship is robust to controlling for reverse causation and simultaneity bias. 
5
 At a micro-level, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) present evidence for three transition countries of a positive link 
between property rights, entrepreneurship, and firm performance. Their results can be interpreted as evidence in 
support of a positive relationship between institutions that support contracting and economic growth. 
6
 Only the first paper considers the possibility of endogeneity between growth and institutions but uses only one 
instrument: ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
7
 Governments in the first group of countries will interact with entrepreneurs according to what Frye and Shleifer 
(1997) have called the “invisible hand” model, according to which “the government … restricts itself to providing 
basic goods, such as contract enforcement, law and order.” Governments in the second group follow the “grabbing 
hand” model, according to which “the government consists of … bureaucrats pursuing their own agendas, including 
taking bribes” (Frye and Shleifer 1997). 
8
 We do not imply that there was no rent-seeking and asset grabbing in manufacturing and other sectors.  Our 
argument is that natural resources are relatively more prone to rent-seeking and asset grabbing.  
9
 Ukraine’s link to Russia predates the establishment of the USSR. From 1654, most of the territory of today’s 
Ukraine fell under the protectorate of Russia. 
10
 Similar theories have also proven effective in explaining cross-country variation in corruption (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993), the size of unofficial economies (Johnson et al. 1997), asset stripping and tunneling (Friedman et al. 
2003) and related lending (Laeven 2001). 
11
 While economic growth in Azerbaijan started to pick up in 1996, growth occurred mainly in oil-related activities 
that were controlled by the state and the political elite (World Bank 2002). 
12
 These sources include, among others, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Freedom House, 
Gallup International, the World Economic Forum, the Heritage Foundation, and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services group. These institutions collect and construct similar 
variables of institutional quality, such as corruption, that have been widely used in the literature. KKM apply 
principal components techniques to this set of variables from various sources to construct broad measures of 
institutional development along six dimensions. By using the KKM measures as broad indicators of institutional 
development we avoid having to choose among these different but closely related variables (the correlation between 
these variables is generally high). Each of the KKM components is highly correlated with most of the underlying 
measures. For example, the index of corruption is highly correlated with the ICRG index of corruption. 
13
 The EBRD reform index is available before 1996 but this is a measure of legislative and regulatory reforms, not a 
broad measure of institutions. 
14
 We only include the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia. 
15
 ICRG data are not available for all countries in our sample for 1996 so that we still have to rely on KKM for the 
end-point of this variable of institution building.  
16
 Table 2 shows a high correlation between all four indicators of institution building. 
17
 While we focus on a dummy that excludes Russia, including Russia in the FSU dummy produces the same results. 
18
 Ten countries joined the EU in 2003: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Except for Cyprus and Malta, these are all transition economies. All 
eight transition economies that joined the EU in 2003 are included in our analysis. 
19
 Using average years of schooling as indicator of human capital accumulation does not change our findings.  
20
 Several countries also used the method of management-employee buyouts to privatize enterprises. 
21
 In some cases, privatization has increased the political power of managers, making it easier for them to extract 
rents from the state. A good example is Russia, where voucher privatization has led to a powerful group of oligarchs 
that have the resources to obstruct institutional development (Barberis et al. 1996 and Frydman et al. 1996). 
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22
 We also controlled for repressed inflation. While repressed inflation does not enter significantly, Institutional 
Development continues to enter positively and significantly 
23
 We also ran a regressions controlling for the size of the country with the log of total population.  While population 
does not enter significantly, Institutional Development continues to enter positively and significantly in both OLS 
and IV regressions.  
24
 In the OLS regression, neither of the two variables enters significantly. 
25
 Our findings are confirmed when we use secondary school enrollment in 1992 or the average years of schooling in 
1990 to measure educational attainment.  
26
 The both reform indicators do not enter jointly significant either. We also tried the individual liberalization 
indicators and obtained the same results.  
27
 We do not have data available for Albania and Macedonia for the pre-transition period.  
28
 We use the average growth rate between 1991and 2004, since the data for the pre-transition period end in 1990.  
Using the 1992-2004 growth rates from Table 1 yields the same finding of a positive and significant correlation of 
Institutional Development and the growth difference.  
29
 If we consider the correlation between the component of Institutional Development explained by Years under 
Socialism and Initial Raw Exports, the correlation is again positive and significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 1: Institutional and Economic Development across Transition Economies 
Institutional Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political stability. Years under 
Socialism is the time (in years) under the socialist regime. Initial Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, and metal 
exports in GDP in the first available year of the sample period. GDP per capita growth is the average growth rate in 








GDP per capita 
growth 
Albania -0.11 45 1.00 5.61
Armenia -0.37 71 3.90 2.50
Azerbaijan -0.87 71 13.33 -1.89 
Belarus -0.81 74 4.08 1.50
Bulgaria -0.15 43 7.99 1.56
Croatia -0.23 44 6.02 1.97
Czech Republic 0.78 42 3.85 2.13
Estonia 0.58 51 4.14 3.00
Georgia -0.71 70 2.49 -2.20 
Hungary 0.64 40 2.73 2.86
Kazakhstan -0.59 71 12.59 1.89
Kyrgyz Republic -0.30 71 5.83 -2.02 
Latvia 0.20 51 0.51 2.11
Lithuania 0.23 51 5.47 0.59
Macedonia -0.35 44 6.17 -0.64 
Moldova -0.22 51 1.26 -4.36 
Poland 0.52 41 4.85 4.20
Romania -0.14 42 2.84 1.78
Russia -0.58 74 12.02 -0.53 
Slovak Republic 0.28 42 11.60 2.69
Slovenia 0.70 44 3.00 3.09
Tajikistan -1.68 71 55.18 -5.17 
Turkmenistan -1.22 71 31.76 1.43
Ukraine -0.52 74 3.58 -2.49 
Average -0.21 56.2 8.25 0.82 
Standard deviation 0.62 13.8 11.88 2.68 
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Table 2: Institution Building, Political Structure, Endowments and Entrenchment: Correlations  
Institutional Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, 
absence of corruption, and political stability. Change in Rule of Law (Corruption) is the difference in the principal component indicator of Rule of Law (Control of 
Corruption), computed by KKM and the respective ICRG measure for the first year of political transition, converted to a variable, with mean zero and standard 
deviation of one. The EBRD reform index is an average of reforms in the areas of enterprise reforms, competition policy, banking sector reform, and reform of non-
banking financial institutions in 1996. Time under the socialist regime is measured by Years under Socialism. Initial Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, and metal 
exports in GDP measured in the first available year of the sample period. Gas reserves/population is natural gas reserves in trillion cubic meters in 1990 proved 
recoverable reserves divided by population. Executive constraints 1930 is the de facto political independence of the chief executive of a country in 1930, ranging from 















Change in Rule of Law 0.735***      
Change in Corruption 0.683*** 0.891***     
EBRD reform 1996 0.900*** 0.599*** 0.548***    
Initial Raw Exports -0.694**** -0.434** -0.374* -0.570***   
Gas reserves/population -0.382* -0.285 -0.300 -0.431** 0.438**  
Years under Socialism -0.764*** -0.760*** -0.714*** -0.670*** 0.416** 0.373* 
Executive Constraints 1930 0.513** 0.107 0.109 0.552*** -0.202 -0.151 -0.359* 
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Table 3: Socialist Entrenchment, Natural Resources and Institution Building 
The regression equation is Institution Building =  + β1Initial Raw Exports + β2 Years under Socialism + ε. Institution Building is Institutional Development, Change 
in Rule of Law, Change in Control of Corruption, or EBRD Reform. Institutional Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political stability. Change in Rule of Law (Corruption) is the 
difference in the principal component indicator of Rule of Law (Control of Corruption), computed by KKM and the respective ICRG measure for the first year of 
political transition, converted to a variable with mean zero and standard deviation of one. The EBRD reform index is an average of reforms in the areas of enterprise 
reforms, competition policy, banking sector reform, and reform of non-banking financial institutions in 1996. Initial Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, metal and 
agricultural raw exports in GDP measured in the first available year of the sample period (generally 1992, otherwise 1994). Time under the socialist regime is 
measured by Years under Socialism. Gas reserves/population is natural gas reserves in trillion cubic meters in 1990 proved recoverable reserves divided by population.  
Executive constraints 1930 is the de facto political independence of the chief executive of a country in 1930, ranging from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity 
or subordination).  The regression in column (7) excludes all countries for which Years under Socialism is 51 or less. Detailed definitions and sources are presented in 
Appendix Table A1. All regressions are run with OLS with robust standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 




Change in Rule 
of Law
Change in Control of 
Corruption






Years under Socialism -0.026 -0.046 -0.035 -0.021 -0.032   
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)***   
Initial Raw Exports -2.386 -1.095 -0.564 -1.616  -3.229 -2.990 
(0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.085)* (0.002)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Gas reserves / population     -0.366   
     (0.004)***   
Executive Constraints       0.118  
1930      (0.006)***
        
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 14 
R-squared 0.755 0.595 0.517 0.551 0.612 0.626 0.579 
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Table 4: Socialist Entrenchment, Natural Resources and Institution Building – Robustness Tests 
The regression is Institutional Development =  + β1Initial Raw Exports + β2 Years under Socialism + β3X + ε. Institutional Development is the average of six 
principal component indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political stability. Initial 
Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, and metal exports in GDP measured in the first available year of the sample period (generally 1992). Time under the socialist 
regime is measured by Years under Socialism. X is an array of control variables: FSU is a dummy variable that takes on value one for countries of the Former Soviet 
Union other than Russia. Ethnic fractionalization is probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group. Landlocked is a 
dummy that takes on value one for countries that do not have direct access to the sea. CMEA Trade share is the share of trade with Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) partners in GDP in 1990. EU Accession is a dummy variable that takes on value one for the countries that joined the EU in 2003. State antiquity is 
a measure of how long the country has been the site of a nation-state, kingdom or empire.  Tertiary enrollment is the ratio of total enrollment in institutions of tertiary 
education, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to this level of education. Civil war is a dummy variable that takes on value 
one for countries that have suffered a civil conflict over the period 1992-02.  Distance from Vienna is measured in kilometers and refers to the capital of the respective 
country. Repressed inflation is the increase in deflated wages minus the change in real GDP over the period 1987 to 1990. Initial liberalization is a principal component 
indicator of three liberalization indexes (for price, trade, and ownership) in 1990. Speed of liberalization is a principal component indicator of the changes in the price, 
trade and ownership liberalization indexes over the period 1990-97. Voucher privatization is a dummy variable if the country opted for mass privatization (as compared 
to direct sales or equity offerings). Detailed definitions and sources are presented in Appendix Table A1. P-values are given in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years under Socialism -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.013 -0.025 -0.026 -0.028 -0.025 -0.026 -0.022 -0.016 -0.032
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)***
Initial Raw Exports -2.366 -2.361 -2.498 -2.220 -2.365 -2.383 -2.334 -2.193 -2.376 -2.404 -1.329 -1.974
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.000)***
FSU 0.109            
 (0.601)            
CMEA Trade share  0.550           
 (0.462)           
Distance from Vienna   0.000          
  (0.615)          
EU Accession    0.667         
    (0.000)***         
Ethnic fractionalization     -0.238        
    (0.545)        
Landlocked      -0.003       
      (0.982)       
State antiquity       -0.528      
       (0.426)      
Civil war        -0.260     
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        (0.022)**     
Tertiary enrolment         0.014    
         (0.935)    
Repressed inflation          -0.006   
          (0.487)   
Initial liberalization           0.450  
           (0.004)***
Change in            0.392  
liberalization           (0.004)***
Voucher privatization            0.183
            (0.266)
             
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 
R-squared 0.759 0.761 0.756 0.932 0.758 0.755 0.762 0.786 0.755 0.761 0.841 0.799
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Table 5: Economic Growth, Institution Building and other Country Characteristics: Correlations  
GDP per capita growth is the annual average growth of real GDP per capita over 1992 to 2004. Log of initial real GDP per capita is measured in 1992 in US dollars. 
Institutional Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, 
absence of corruption, and political stability. FSU is a dummy variable that takes on value one for countries of the Former Soviet Union other than Russia. Ethnic 
fractionalization is probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group. Landlocked is a dummy that takes on value one 
for countries that do not have direct access to the sea. CMEA Trade share is the share of trade with Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) partners in GDP 
in 1990. EU Accession is a dummy variable that takes on value one for the countries that joined the EU in 2003.  Tertiary enrollment is the ratio of total enrollment in 
institutions of tertiary education, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to this level of education. Civil war is a dummy 
variable that takes on value one for countries that have suffered a civil conflict over the period 1992-02.  Distance from Vienna is measured in kilometers and refers to 
the capital of the respective country. Initial liberalization is a principal component indicator of three liberalization indexes (for price, trade, and ownership) in 1990. 
Speed of liberalization is a principal component indicator of the changes in the price, trade and ownership liberalization indexes over the period 1990-97. Voucher 
privatization is a dummy variable if the country opted for mass privatization (as compared to direct sales or equity offerings). Government consumption is the share of 





































Log(GDP per capita 1992) 0.159               
Institutional Development 0.504** 0.621***              
FSU -0.237 -0.516*** -0.494**             
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.471** -0.253 -0.297 0.510**            
Landlocked -0.312 -0.179 -0.307 0.251 0.097           
CMEA Trade Share -0.186 -0.267 -0.395* 0.809*** 0.228 0.199          
Tertiary enrolment -0.306 0.313 0.082 0.318 0.099 -0.465** 0.389*         
EU Accession 0.421** 0.659*** 0.805*** -0.237 -0.270 -0.177 -0.066 0.130        
Civil War 0.118 -0.545*** -0.431** 0.145 -0.183 0.000 -0.097 -0.384* -0.408**       
Distance from Vienna -0.338 -0.534*** -0.694*** 0.634*** 0.478** 0.399* 0.352* 0.070 -0.499** 0.253      
Initial liberalization 0.181 0.654*** 0.527*** -0.634*** -0.318 -0.184 -0.512** 0.014 0.428** -0.175 -0.528***     
Speed of liberalization -.054 -0.411** 0.021 0.357* 0.264 -0.070 0.172 0.045 -0.053 0.016 0.232 -0.776***    
Voucher privatization -0.269 -0.308 -0.105 0.489** 0.331 0.129 0.311 0.158 -0.151 0.026 0.309 -0.498** 0.656***
Government consumption -0.093 0.527 *** 0.393* -0.157 0.119 -0.157 0.067 0.101 0.407** -0.326 -0.429** 0.342 -0.188 0.006  
Monetary growth -0.198 -0.114 -0.594*** 0.378* -0.006 0.139 0.461** 0.390* -0.609*** 0.065 0.284 -0.333 -0.133 0.000 -0.183 
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Table 6: Institution Building and Economic Development  
The first stage regression is Institution Building =  + β1Initial Raw Exports + β2 Years under Socialism + β3 Initial + ε. The second stage regression is Economic 
Development =  + β1 Predicted value of Institution Building + β2 Initial + ε. Institution Building is Institutional Development, Change in Rule of Law, Change in 
Corruption or EBRD reform in 1996. Institutional Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political stability. In regression (2) we exclude influential outliers as identified using the 
approach described in Besley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). Change in Rule of Law (Corruption) is the difference in the principal component indicator of Rule of Law 
(Control of Corruption), computed by KKM and the respective ICRG measure for the first year of political transition, converted to a variable with mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. The EBRD reform index is an average of reforms in the areas of enterprise reforms, competition policy, banking sector reform, and reform 
of non-banking financial institutions in 1996. Initial Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, and metal exports in GDP measured in the first available year of the sample 
period. Time under the socialist regime is measured by Years under Socialism. Economic Development is annual average growth of real GDP per capita or annual 
average growth of household consumption per capita, over the period 1992 to 2004.  Initial is initial real GDP per capita or initial household consumption per capita. 
The null-hypothesis of the F-test is that the exogenous excluded variables do not explain Institutional Development in the first stage. The null hypothesis of the test of 
overidentifying restrictions is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Finally, we report β1 from the OLS regression: Economic Development =  + β1
Institutional Development + β2 Initial + ε. Detailed definitions and sources are presented in Appendix Table A1. P-values are given in parentheses. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
GDP per capita 
growth 92-04 
GDP per capita 
growth 92-04 
GDP per capita 
growth 92-04 
GDP per capita 
growth 92-04 
GDP per capita 
growth 92-04 
Household consumption 
growth per capita, 92-04
Institutional Development 0.026 0.029    -0.038 
(0.036)** (0.013)**    (0.008)*** 
Log (Initial dependent variable) -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 0.068 
(0.567) (0.418) (0.670) (0.651) (0.479) (0.000)*** 
Change in Rule of Law  0.022   
(0.039)**   
Change in Corruption   0.026  
 (0.035)**  
EBRD Reform 1996  0.040
(0.118) 
    
Observations 24 20 24 24 24 19 
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 0.749 0.437 0.348 0.478 0.839 0.603 
OLS coefficient 0.024 0.027 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.046 
 (0.024)** (0.033)** (0.042)** (0.065)* (0.197) (0.030)** 
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Table 7: Institution Building and Economic Development: Robustness Tests 
The first stage regression is Institutional Development =  + β1Initial Raw Exports + β2 Years under Socialism + β3 Log(GDP per capita 1992) + β4 X+ ε. The second 
stage regression is GDP per capita growth 92-04 =  + β1 Predicted value of Institutional Development + β2 Log(GDP per capita 1992) +β3 X + ε.  Institutional 
Development is the average of six principal component indicators: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of 
corruption, and political stability.  Residual Institutional Development is the residual of a regression of Institutional Development on initial price, trade and ownership 
liberalization and speed of reform in these areas. Initial Raw Exports is the share of fuel, ores, and metal exports in GDP measured in the first available year of the 
sample period. Time under the socialist regime is measured by Years under Socialism.  X is a vector of control variables. FSU is a dummy variable that takes on value 
one for countries of the Former Soviet Union other than Russia. Ethnic fractionalization is probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from 
the same ethnic group. Landlocked is a dummy that takes on value one for countries that do not have direct access to the sea. CMEA Trade share is the share of trade 
with Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) partners in GDP in 1990. EU Accession is a dummy variable that takes on value one for the countries that 
joined the EU in 2003.  Distance from Vienna is measured in kilometers and refers to the capital of the respective country. Tertiary enrollment is the ratio of total 
enrollment in institutions of tertiary education, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to this level of education. Civil war is a 
dummy variable that takes on value one for countries that have suffered a civil conflict over the period 1992-02.  Initial liberalization is a principal component indicator 
of three liberalization indexes (for price, trade, and ownership) in 1990. Speed of liberalization is a principal component indicator of the changes in the price, trade and 
ownership liberalization indexes over the period 1990-97. Voucher privatization is a dummy variable if the country opted for mass privatization (as compared to direct 
sales or equity offerings). Government consumption is the share of government consumption in GDP, averaged over the sample period. Monetary growth is the annual 
growth rate of reserve money, averaged over the sample period.  The null-hypothesis of the F-test is that the exogenous excluded variables do not explain Institutional 
Development in the first stage. The null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Finally, we 
report β1 from the OLS regression: Economic Development =  + β1 Institutional Development + β2 Log(GDP per capita 1992)+β3 X + ε.   Detailed definitions and 
sources are presented in Appendix Table A1. P-values are given in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Institutional  0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.024 0.043  0.025 0.027 0.032 
           Development (0.047)** (0.034)** (0.060)* (0.084)* (0.101) (0.092)* (0.052)* (0.077)* (0.097)*  (0.044)** (0.013)** (0.015)**
Residual Institutional          0.086    
            Development          (0.029)**
Log(GDP per capita  -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 0.005 -0.008 -0.000 -0.007 
       in 1992) (0.585) (0.569) (0.413) (0.603) (0.472) (0.580) (0.923) (0.677) (0.496) (0.545) (0.402) (0.995) (0.502) 
FSU -0.001             
 (0.935)             
CMEA Trade share  0.006            
  (0.893)            
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.057           
   (0.142)           
Landlocked    -0.008          
    (0.409)          
EU Accession     0.002         
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
     (0.894)         
Distance from Vienna      0.000        
     (0.974)        
Civil war       0.025       
      (0.067)*       
Tertiary enrolment        -0.009      
       (0.545)      
Initial liberalization         -0.015     
        (0.349)     
Speed of liberalization         -0.017     
        (0.350)     
Voucher privatization           -0.014   
          (0.165)   
Government             -0.034  
     Consumption            (0.112)  
Monetary growth             0.023 
            (0.376) 
             
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 24 24 
F-test (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.048** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Test of overidentifying 0.688 0.771 0.623 0.778 0.723 0.532 0.384 0.325 0.725 0. 621 0.168 0.545 0.918 
restrictions (p-value)              
OLS result 0.024 0.025 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.020 0.036 0.039 0.025 0.026 0.031 
(0.029)** (0.022)** (0.039)** (0.052)* (0.190) (0.067)* (0.028)** (0.070)* (0.012)** (0.056)* (0.017)** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
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Appendix Table A1: Definitions of Variables and Sources of Data
Variable Definition Source 
Institutional Development
Measure of institutional development in 1996 along six dimensions: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption, and political stability. Measure is a 
principal components indicator of these six components with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one.  
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2004). 
Initial Raw Exports Share of fuel, ores, and metal raw exports in GDP in the first available year of the sample period.  World Development Indicators (WDI)
Gar reserves/population Natural gas reserves in trillion cubic meters in 1990 proven recoverable reserves divided by population World Resources 1996-97 and WDI 
Years under Socialism Number of years under socialism.  De Melo et al. (2001) 
EBRD reform 
Average of four indices measuring reforms in the areas of enterprise reform, competition policy, banking 
sector reform and reform of non-banking financial institutions. 
EBRD (2001) Transition Report 
FSU
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country was part of the former Soviet Union (other than 




De facto political independence of chief executive of a country, measured in 1930, ranging from 1 
(unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination)   
Polity IV 
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are not from the same ethnic group.  Alesina et al. (2003) 
Landlocked Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country is landlocked, and zero otherwise. Own calculations. 
CMEA trade share Share of trade with CMEA partners in GDP in 1990.  De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996). 
Tertiary enrollment 
Ratio of total enrollment in institutions of tertiary education, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to this level of education. 
WDI 
EU accession Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country joined the European Union in 2003. European Commission 
Civil war Dummy variable that takes a value of one if there was a civil war in the country during 1992-2004  Murrell (1996). 
Distance from Vienna Distance of the capital from Vienna, in kilometers Gleditsch and Ward (2001) 
State Antiquity 
An index of how long the country has been the site of a nation-state, kingdom or empire during the past 
2000 years 
Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman 
(2002) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by total population in US dollars WDI 
GDP per capita growth Average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant local currency, averaged over 1992 to 2004 WDI
Household consumption 
growth per capita 
Average annual real growth rate of financial household consumption expenditure per capita over the 
period 1992 to 2004.  
WDI 
Initial liberalization Principal component indicator of three liberalization indexes (price, trade, and ownership) in 1990. De Melo et al. (2001). 
Speed of liberalization 
Principal component indicator of the changes in the price, trade and ownership liberalization indexes over 
1990-97. 
De Melo et al. (2001). 
Voucher privatization 
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country opted for mass privatization (as compared to 
direct sales or equity offerings), and zero otherwise.  
EBRD (1998) Transition Report and 
Estrin (2002). 
Government consumption Share of government consumption in GDP, averaged over 1992-2004.  WDI
Monetary growth Average annual growth rate of reserve money, averaged over 1992-2004. WDI
